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Weak governance is one of the key obstacles for sustainable development. Undoubtedly, improvement of 7 
governance comes with a broad range of co-benefits including countries’ abilities to respond to pressing 8 
global challenges such as climate change. However, beyond the qualitative acknowledgement of its 9 
importance, quantifications of future pathways of governance are still lacking. This study provides 10 
projections of future governance in line with the Shared Socio-economic Pathways (SSPs). We find that 11 
under a “rocky road” scenario, 30% of the global population would still live in countries characterized by 12 
weak governance in 2050, while under a “green road” scenario weak governance would almost be entirely 13 
overcome over the same time frame. Based on pathways for governance, we estimate the adaptive capacity 14 
of countries to climate change. Limits to adaptive capacity exist even under optimistic pathways beyond 15 
mid-century. Our findings underscore the importance of accounting for governance in assessments of 16 
climate change impacts. 17 
 18 
Future societies’ resilience against global challenges such as climate change hinges upon 19 
successful implementation of policies, actions and development strategies1. Those actions need 20 
to be facilitated by the quality and efficiency of governance, which makes governance an 21 
essential ingredient for assessing countries future climate vulnerability and coping capacity 2. 22 
More broadly, institutions and governance are key determinants of long-term stability and 23 
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sustainable growth of nations3. Advancing human and economic development requires active and 24 
effective governance capable of making relevant policy addressing present day challenges and 25 
providing quality welfare and services4. This is also the focus of Sustainable Development Goal 26 
(SDG) 16 (Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions), which aims at promoting the rule of law; 27 
substantially reducing corruption, developing effective, accountable and transparent institutions 28 
and building of institutional capacity at all levels5. Likewise, strengthening institutions to achieve 29 
beneficial social outcomes is central to the fulfilment of other SDGs, such as ending poverty in all 30 
its forms everywhere (SDG 1), achieving gender equality (SDG 5) and reducing inequality within 31 
and among countries (SDG 10)5.  32 
 33 
With respect to countries’ capacity to adapt to climate change, good governance and institutions 34 
have been identified as key conditions for the successful deployment of adaptation options2,6. The 35 
IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) characterizes adaptation barriers (or constraints) as 36 
“factors that make it harder to plan and implement adaptation actions or that restrict options”. 37 
Lack of institutional capacity is identified as the most pertinent constraint to adaptation across 38 
many sectors (e.g. water, urban areas, human health, human security) and in all world regions2. 39 
The numerous interventions that may enable or hinder adaptation – such as prioritizing policies, 40 
mobilizing resources, coordination of efforts, decision-making – are  processes often contingent 41 
on the efficacy of institutional mechanisms2. A recent review of economic literature on adoption of 42 
environmental policy, for instance, finds a positive relationship between policy adoption and 43 
various indicators of institutional quality7. Inept governance can even hinder a country’s ability to 44 
realize adaptation goals and targets set according to the country’s level of vulnerability8. 45 
Countries with better governance are also found to be more likely to receive adaptation aid from 46 
donors since it is assumed that adaptation funding will be used more effectively9. 47 
In particular, the level of corruption within institutions, which is one of the main determinants of 48 
the quality of governance, is highly relevant for climate change adaptation10,11. In a country with 49 
weak governance, investments in adaptation measures can potentially pose corruption risks12. 50 
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There is evidence that the level of corruption such as bribery and misuse of resources can be 51 
more severe in post-disaster operations as compared to the pre-disaster12. Corruption weakens 52 
institutions, damages public trust and the strength of social contract, diverts funds from budgets 53 
and investments, interferes with the flow of development aid and hinders human capital 54 
formation13,14. Improving governance and strengthening anti-corruption measures thus is critical 55 
for implementation of adaptation actions. 56 
Understanding current and future evolution of governance is necessary for assessments of 57 
adaptive capacity and thereby the impacts of future climate change. Insights into the temporal 58 
evolution of adaptive capacity can also indicate the existence of limits to adaptation at a given 59 
point in time. Quantification of adaptive capacity also has practical application in climate impact 60 
models. Understanding governance outlook hence can reveal future challenges in climate change 61 
adaptation. 62 
 63 
 64 
Governance in the Shared Socio-economic Pathways 65 
 66 
To operationalize and facilitate future climate impact assessments, the Shared-Socioeconomic 67 
Pathways (SSP) scenarios have been developed. The pathways are categorized along the 68 
assessed challenges to climate mitigation and adaptation. The five qualitative storylines describe 69 
different characteristics of and interactions between natural resources, economy, demography, 70 
lifestyle, human development, technology and institutions15. The SSPs provide a framework to 71 
assess a wide range of possible futures and societal changes both between and within countries, 72 
and the extent to which these conditions create challenges to mitigation and adaptation to climate 73 
change. Some adaptation-relevant dimensions including population and education16, 74 
urbanization17 and income18–20 human development21 and inequality22 have already been quantified 75 
in the  SSP framework.  A quantification of the SSPs in terms of future governance trajectories, 76 
however, has not yet been realized.  77 
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 78 
The departure point for the quantification of an indicator of governance along the five SSPs is the 79 
qualitative description in the scenarios’ narratives15, captured by the characterization of 80 
institutions and their effectiveness as outlined in Table 1. SSP1 is the “green road” scenario, 81 
which envisages a rapid shift to sustainable development, increases in education and health 82 
investments, declining inequality both within and between countries, and de-emphasis on 83 
economic growth and reduction of resource intensity in favor of improving environmental 84 
conditions. Institutions are expected to become increasingly effective and international 85 
cooperation becomes persistent. Such features make the SSP1 world characterized by low 86 
challenges to both climate mitigation and adaptation as a result of inclusive economic growth and 87 
sustainable welfare. The “middle of the road“ scenario SSP2 is characterized by uneven and 88 
sluggish economic growth and development with slower progress towards achieving the SDGs. 89 
SSP2 does not differ substantially from the present-day trends. SSP2 is largely consistent with 90 
historical dynamics, but it takes into account dynamic relationships among socioeconomic 91 
determinants and convergence between countries. Institutions in SSP2 are modestly effective and 92 
uneven. SSP3, also termed the “rocky road” scenario, expects regional and global conflicts to 93 
result from international fragmentation and inter-country rivalry. Countries are preoccupied with 94 
national goals, which weakens international cooperation. Governance in SSP3 is rather ineffective 95 
and support for international and development institutions is reduced. “A road divided” or SSP4 96 
presents low challenges to mitigation thanks to global technological advancement but high 97 
challenges to adaptation due to the unequal distribution of resources both within and across 98 
countries. Governance is assumed to be stronger in high-income regions whilst in low-income 99 
regions, basic human development is neglected and policy implementation is likely to be 100 
unsuccessful due to weak governance.   Higher inequalities result in weak representation of the 101 
vulnerable groups and persistence of low levels of development. The SSP3 and SSP4 scenarios 102 
present the highest challenges to adaptation, caused by the combination of slow development, 103 
low education, high inequality and weak institutions. Finally, SSP5 is characterized by 104 
development driven by fossil fuel-intensive economies which enable countries to become richer 105 
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and more equitable at the price of substantial environmental degradation. Similar to SSP1, the 106 
SSP5 scenario also assumes improved institutions and rapid human development, particularly for 107 
the currently disadvantaged populations. However, unlike in SSP1, the nature of the underlying 108 
growth in SSP5 relies heavily on fossil fuel use and results in high challenges to climate change 109 
mitigation15. 110 
 111 
 SSP1 SSP2 SSP3 SSP4  SSP5 
Governance Effective Modestly 
effective 
Ineffective Unequal 
within 
countries  
Increasingly 
effective 
Income High Medium Very  unequal 
between 
countries 
Very unequal 
within and 
between 
countries 
High 
Higher education High Medium Low Unequal High 
Gender equality 
education 
High Medium Low Unequal 
within 
regions 
High 
Table 1: Overview of representation of governance and its correlates in the five SSP scenarios. 112 
 113 
Future pathways of governance 114 
In order to quantify and project governance trajectories along the SSPs scenarios, we rely on 115 
theoretical insights on the determinants of good governance for an empirical specification. 116 
Subsequently, an econometric model is employed to establish a relationship between governance 117 
and countries’ socio-economic indicators of which projections along the five SSP scenarios are 118 
already available. Future projections of governance evolution within the SSP framework are then 119 
derived and can be used to evaluate the challenges to adaptation together with an internally 120 
consistent set of socioeconomic variables in the SSPs. 121 
 122 
Given its breath and depth, governance (a dependent variable in our econometric model) and its 123 
dimensions can be conceptualized in many ways. Here we use the well-established Worldwide 124 
Governance Indicators (WGI) that provide a composite index for governance with six sub-125 
categories: voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory 126 
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quality, rule of law and control of corruption. The indicators presented in this database aggregate 127 
perceptions of governance of a large number of enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents 128 
from 31 different data sources provided by 25 different organizations, and provide a broad 129 
country coverage23. The strength of the WGIs in capturing an inherently complex concept lays in 130 
its many different data sources that summarize information on the various dimensions of 131 
governance, and through averaging the data on the country level control for the possible 132 
idiosyncrasies between sources24. 133 
 134 
The choice of the determinants of good governance (our explanatory variables) is based on 135 
modernization theory which posits that economic and educational development are central 136 
determinants of improvements in the rule of law25,26. There is, in addition, ample empirical 137 
evidence of a causal relationship between female representation in government and reduced 138 
levels of corruption27, as well as a strong connection between gender empowerment and 139 
democracy4. Within the SSP framework, economic as well as education trajectories are readily 140 
available18,16. For gender equality, we use the difference in mean years of schooling between men 141 
and women a proxy variable. This measure of gender equality arguably represents only one 142 
dimension of it, but gender gaps in education can be credibly taken as indicative of more 143 
widespread gender inequality issues in a society. 144 
 145 
The model (see Methods) is estimated using a panel data for 173 countries for the time period 146 
from 1995 to 2015. Although governance indicators at the subnational level are available for a few 147 
countries, the most granular SSP projections with global coverage for other socioeconomic 148 
variables are only available at the country level, which also defines our unit of cross-sectional 149 
variation. 150 
 151 
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 152 
Our econometric analysis shows that the aggregate governance indicator from the WGI 153 
database23 can be well predicted using GDP per capita, the share of population with higher 154 
education and the gender gap in mean years of schooling  (see Table 1 in Supplementary 155 
Information). The estimated elasticities linking the variables in the specification to changes in 156 
governance indicators appear robust to changes in the modelling strategy. The estimates 157 
obtained from the model are then combined with the available country-level indicators of socio-158 
economic performance within the SSP framework to calculate projections of the governance 159 
indicators over the 21st century. 160 
 161 
In line with the SSP narratives, future projections of governance show distinct differences 162 
between the scenarios (Figure 1). For developed countries such as Germany or Japan, whether 163 
the country follows the most or the least progressive scenario makes only a minor difference for 164 
Figure 1: Evolution of governance over the 21st century 
The 2015 values of the normalized composite world governance indicator (WGI) in 2015 are shown in a, overlaid with the 
scenario dependent evolution of governance for selected countries over the 21st century. The governance indicator is 
normalized to a range from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating better governance. The global distribution of future 
governance in 2050 is depicted for different SSPs ranging from a ‘sustainable future’ (SSP1, b) to a ‘middle of the road’ 
scenario (SSP2, c) and a ‘rocky road’ scenario characterized by unequal development and regional rivalry (SSP3, d).  
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the dynamics of the projected governance indicator since their score remains very high in all 165 
scenarios. For less well-off countries, however, the path of the socio-economic development is 166 
decisive for how governance is expected to evolve (Figure 1 b,c,d): for countries like Somalia or 167 
Nigeria, the difference between following the SSP1 (“green road”) and SSP3 (“rocky road”) could 168 
result in anything from stagnation to trifold improvement.  169 
 170 
Under the SSP3 scenario, little improvement in governance is projected globally over the 21st 171 
century. In contrast, substantial progress already by mid-century is evident under the SSP1 172 
scenario which envisages a sustainable future. Similarities between SSP1 and SSP5 arise as a 173 
result of the almost identical representation of governance  in the original storylines, which is 174 
reproduced in our projections. Although the development narrative and resulting climate 175 
mitigation challenges in SSP1 and SSP5 differ fundamentally, their socio-economic development 176 
trajectories are remarkably similar. SSP4 on the other hand, yields results that are in between 177 
SSP2 and SSP3.  Because of these similarities, in two of the figures we report results for only for 178 
SSP1, SSP2 and SSP3. 179 
 180 
 181 
 182 
Figure 2: Country groups and population-weighted projections  
a-c, The number of countries per SSP in different governance categories for 2015, 2050 and 2100, respectively. The governance indicator is 
normalized with 0 indicating very low levels of governance across all indicators and 1 indicating very high levels23. For illustration purposes, 
we introduce the following percentile-based categorization based on the 2015 governance scores : very good (>90th percentile), good (75 - 
90), medium (50 - 74), weak (25 - 49), very weak (<25th percentile). d-f, Estimated population living in countries with different governance 
levels for 2015, 2050 and 2100. Total population size differ as a result of the diverging projections of future population under different SSPs. 
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There is no rule of thumb for which levels of this indicator represent ‘good’ governance. In fact, 183 
any such categorization arguably also includes value judgement. For the sake of illustrating the 184 
changes over the 21st century, however, we introduce percentile categories based on the 2015 185 
distribution of the governance scores (see Figure 2).  A clear scenario dependence for projected 186 
governance is apparent at a country level (Figure 2a-c). The differences are even more striking 187 
when we consider the implications for future populations in countries with different governance 188 
regimes (Figure 2d-f). Many countries whose populations are projected to grow substantially are 189 
expected to undergo transition and improve their governance over the coming decades, i.e. from 190 
“weak” to “medium”, or further. Under the rapid development scenarios such as SSP1 and SSP5, 191 
this implies that only a small number of countries will be characterized by very weak or weak 192 
governance (defined as the state of a country below the median of the governance indicator 193 
today) and almost all countries may reach states of good governance by the end of the century. In 194 
contrast, countries that are home to around 3 (5) billion people in 2050 (2100), will continue to be 195 
characterized by weak governance under the SSP3 scenario (Figure 2). Even under a middle-of-196 
the-road SSP2 scenario, about 1.5 billion people will be living in about 40 countries characterized 197 
by weak governance by mid-century.  198 
 199 
The projection exercise combines short to medium-term dynamic adjustments based on the 200 
estimated relationships (and thus extrapolated using the correlation structures found in historical 201 
data) with assumption-driven long term developments that ensure the internal consistency of the 202 
trajectories with respect to the SSP narratives. Throughout the paper we report results solely for 203 
the aggregate governance indicator. However, the projections of the individual dimensions of the 204 
indicator can also be used if found to be particularly relevant for the socio-economic issue or a 205 
policy objective in focus. Based on our compositional analysis of the governance indicator, 206 
adjusted estimates of the effects of socioeconomic developments on particular components of 207 
the governance indicator are calculated to provide projections of specific subcomponents such 208 
as corruption or governance effectiveness (see Methods and Supplementary Information). This 209 
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makes our results applicable to a wide range of issues under consideration in policy agendas 210 
related to sustainable development and climate actions. 211 
 212 
It is important to highlight that our approach does not imply a direction of causal linkages. 213 
Improvements in governance in the context of sustainable development can lead to a virtuous 214 
cycle between governance and development, rather than showing a cause-and-effect 215 
relationship28. Since the focus of our model is not to unveil the causal effects, but rather to 216 
consistently extend the SSPs, such potential mutually re-enforcing dynamics only further 217 
underscore the need for an integration of governance into the SSP framework.  218 
 219 
Importance of near-term improvements in governance 220 
 221 
In a world with near-term sustainable development targets and ongoing climate change, the 222 
temporal evolution of our governance indicators is of particular interest. We find that countries 223 
characterized by very weak governance, albeit starting from a low level, have an up to five times  224 
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 225 
higher rate of improvement in scenarios of rapid socio-economic development under SSP1 and 226 
SSP5 compared to SSP3. The absolute values for countries in the ‘medium’ category is 227 
considerably smaller, although differences between the scenarios are still evident (up to a factor 228 
of four between SSP1 and SSP3). Over time, countries move out of the lower categories, and their 229 
rates of change reduce as they improve governance. Our analysis suggests a window of 230 
opportunity to eradicate lowest levels of governance in the near term. This highlights the 231 
importance of achieving the goals under the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development to  232 
facilitate long-term sustainable development, particularly for the countries characterized by the 233 
lowest levels of development to date. 234 
 235 
Governance and adaptation to climate change 236 
 237 
Figure 3: Rates of change of governance 
Box-Whisker diagram of the five-year rates of change in governance for different SSPs over the 21st century. The lower 
and upper hinges correspond to the first and third quartiles (the 25th and 75th percentiles). The upper whisker extends 
from the hinge to the highest value that is within 1.5 * interquartile range of the hinge. Data beyond the end of the whiskers 
are outliers and plotted as points. Panels separate out the evolution for country groupings classified by their state of 
governance (time-dependent). For SSP 1, no countries will be in the ‘very weak’ category after 2030 (2050) following high 
rates of improvement in governance in the preceding decades. SSP 4 and 5 are omitted from the figure for clarity. 
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Adaptation is multi-faceted and sector-dependent. As both the integral part of sustainable 238 
development and a stand-alone mechanism in coping with climate change, adaptive capacity is 239 
difficult to measure because of the volatile nature of its many determinants. Successful adaptation 240 
will depend in part on the timescales of improvement of socio-economic factors many of which 241 
are now available in the SSP framework. The existing projections including that of governance 242 
can subsequently be used for designing an overarching framework to evaluate more granular and 243 
sector-specific measurements of adaptive capacity. 244 
 245 
Across all scales, however, a key determinant is the ability to effectively leverage private and 246 
public sector investment for adaptation actions. This is coined “adaptation readiness” in the Notre 247 
Dame Global Adaptation Index (ND-GAIN)29, a summary indicator of countries’ vulnerability to 248 
climate change. The concept of adaptation readiness can also be seen as an indication for 249 
countries’ absorptive capacities of international climate finance channeled, for instance, through 250 
the Green Climate Fund30. If the readiness is low, successful adaptation financing and 251 
implementation is questionable. Governance is indeed a key ingredient in the ND-GAIN readiness 252 
score. Given the high correlation of the readiness score with our governance indicator (0.93, p = 253 
0.000), our projections thereby allow us to deduce the future trajectories of the ND-GAIN 254 
readiness score in line with the different SSP scenarios. 255 
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 256 
The range of adaptation readiness spanned by the member states of the Organization for 257 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) today match well with our ‘good’ and ‘very 258 
good’ categories. Most developing countries, however, will barely, if at all, reach levels of ‘good’ 259 
adaptation readiness by mid-century, even under the optimistic scenarios SSP1 and SSP5 (Figure 260 
4). Under SSP3 and SSP4, little to no improvement in adaptation readiness is apparent, with an 261 
ever increasing number of people living in countries with low adaptive capacity (see Figures 6 and 262 
7 in Supplementary Information). Our results are fully in line with the qualitative classification of 263 
adaptation challenges in the SSP scenarios: low challenges in SSP1 and SSP5; and high 264 
challenges in SSP 3 and SSP415. However, we also show that ‘low challenges’ are not equivalent 265 
to ‘no challenges’. Even under SSP 1, adaptive  capacity will only increase gradually over the next 266 
decades while an adaptation deficit to present day climate is already apparent31. To that end, our 267 
results also illustrate what could be considered an ‘upper limit’ of the future evolution of adaptive 268 
capacity.  269 
 270 
 271 
Timescales of governance and climate change 272 
 273 
Figure 4: Projections of the ND GAIN Adaptation Readiness score. Trajectories for India, Somalia and Syria are shown for 
different SSPs. The projections of the Adaptation Readiness score are based on our projections of future governance. The 
shaded region marks the range of the readiness indicator for categories ‘good’ and ‘very good’ in 2015 (0.52-0.80). For global 
projections see Figures S6 and S7. 
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The recent IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C1 has underscored the substantial 274 
differences in climate impacts between 1.5°C and 2°C that could materialize already before mid-275 
century. Tropical regions will be bearing the brunt of these differences32–34 and will also be the 276 
regions where the anthropogenic climate change is emerging the fastest against the background 277 
of natural variability35. Thereby, while vulnerable countries will be striving for sustainable 278 
development and improving their adaptive capacity, climate impacts will continue to intensify. Our 279 
results show that even under scenarios of rapid and sustainable development (SSP1 and SSP5), 280 
improvements of adaptive capacity will take on average at least three decades. This indicates that 281 
(temporal) limits to improvements in adaptive capacity may persist during the 21st century leading 282 
to elevated risks and impacts of climate change in countries with low socio-economic 283 
development. Climate impacts that exceed the limits to adaptation will result in climate-related 284 
loss and damage36–38. Given that negative climate impacts can hamper countries’ abilities to 285 
achieve sustainable development, and thereby improving adaptive capacity, our results indicate 286 
that adequate responses and support schemes for loss and damage will be crucial policy 287 
instruments to support vulnerable countries39. 288 
 289 
Country-level representation of governance does have several limitations. The methodological 290 
framework used for the projection exercise presented in this study can be complemented with 291 
methods to downscale global assumptions and estimates. Scenario narratives and local 292 
interpretations of the SSPs can be derived from qualitative methods. The analytical methods 293 
employed to provide inference on the drivers of institutional change rely on the assumption of a 294 
common response of the governance indicators to their determinants across countries. 295 
Combining the advantages of a global analytical model of governance dynamics such as the one 296 
presented here with those of a narrative based on a qualitative context-specific assessment of 297 
future governance changes can improve the quality of our projections further. Such an extension 298 
of our analysis appears particularly important for countries for which the existing data are missing 299 
or not reliable, as well as for countries where disruptive changes in the current institutional setting 300 
are likely in the future. To address the issue of internal inequalities and sub-national specificities, 301 
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we here have to rely on our indicator’s multiple sources and dimensions. An analysis 302 
incorporating sub-national information is a promising research avenue. Further unobserved 303 
differences between countries are controlled for in our model by using country-specific fixed 304 
effects, and global trends by yearly fixed effects. 305 
 306 
The SSP narrative framework by design does not incorporate feedbacks of climate impacts. This 307 
is important to keep in mind, particularly in the context of high warming scenarios or in scenarios 308 
with persistently low levels of development in some regions of the world. Even under the SSP3 309 
scenario, no country is projected to see a decline in socio-economic development. This ‘scenario 310 
optimism’ can stand in stark contrast to the observed dynamics, where in reality some countries 311 
such as Syria have experienced rapid decline in stability over the past recent years (Figure 1a). 312 
The dynamics behind such deteriorations are difficult to incorporate in deterministic modelling 313 
approaches underlying the SSPs, which represents a limitation of scenario frameworks in general. 314 
While conflicts are context-dependent and not deterministic, some key determinants of conflict 315 
risks can be linked to the SSP pathways and indicate increasing globally increasing conflict risks 316 
for SSP3 and SSP4 centered in Central and South Asia as well as Africa40. Considering such risks 317 
would lead to considerably higher probabilities for a deterioration of governance under those 318 
scenarios, thereby painting a more accurate, but even bleaker picture compared to the 319 
sustainable development scenarios.  320 
 321 
Uncertainties related to trajectories of future vulnerability have been found to dominate climate 322 
impacts in the near term41, but will also shape the end-of-century climate impacts42. Climate-323 
related natural disasters displace millions43 already today, cause multi-billion dollar damages44 324 
and may even contribute to increased risks of armed conflict oubreaks45 and exacerbate forced 325 
migration46. Projections of future economic impacts of climate change indicate non-linear 326 
increases in damages, which are most pronounced for tropical countries47. Thereby, integrating 327 
climate change impacts into SSP trajectories would affect the global trajectories of socio-328 
economic development, in particular for high emission scenarios. To do so, however, requires an 329 
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improved understanding of the prospects of future adaptation. The projections of governance and 330 
adaptive capacity provided here contribute to closing this gap. Our study thus presents a step 331 
forward towards a more integrated scenario perspective to inform global policies aimed at 332 
achieving sustainable development.  333 
 334 
 335 
 336 
 337 
 338 
 339 
 340 
 341 
 342 
 343 
 344 
 345 
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Methods 453 
 454 
Data 455 
 456 
We use the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) database, that provides a composite governance index 457 
based six categories: voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory 458 
quality, rule of law and control of corruption. After standardizing the indicator from its original -2.5 to 2.5 459 
range to the range from 0 to 1, our main response variable was the arithmetic average of the six 460 
components, referred to as the governance indicator throughout the paper. Historical GDP per capita is 461 
taken from the Penn World Table 7.01 and SSP projections from Crespo Cuaresma2. Measures of education 462 
(share of population with post-secondary education) and gender equality in education (difference in mean 463 
years of schooling between men and women) come from the Wittgenstein Centre for Demography and 464 
Global Human Capital3. 465 
 466 
Model 467 
 468 
The estimation of the effects of the covariates mentioned above on the governance indicator was carried 469 
out using a yearly country-level panel data spanning the period between 1995 and 2015. Our main 470 
specification is as follows:  471 
 472 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒),+ = 	𝛽/ ln(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐)),+ +	𝛽9𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛),+ +	𝛽>𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑎𝑝),+ +	𝛼) +	𝛾+ + 𝜀),+ (1) 473 
 474 
where 𝛼) controls for time-invariant country-specific characteristics, and gt  accounts for common shocks in 475 
the sample in the form of year-fixed effects. Including fixed effects allows for the presence of omitted 476 
factors and long term trends that might affect both sides of the equation, therefore eliminating bias that 477 
might arise from cross-sectional analyses. We provide additional specifications in the Supplementary 478 
Information (Table 1), and show that our results are robust for within and between-country regressions 479 
underscoring the robustness of our findings  also  in the light of cross-national differences. 480 
 481 
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We project the data forward to the year 2100 by using the coefficient estimates of the model given by 482 
equation (1) and imposing them over the internally consistent projections of GDP, education and gender 483 
gap in education which is given by the set of existing SSP projections. To remain consistent with the 484 
narratives, we account for the unobserved characteristics captured by the country fixed effects, which go 485 
beyond what can be explained with changes in governance and are likely to capture further intangible 486 
characteristics such as culture, by assuming that they will change over the long course of the projection 487 
period. In other words, we calculate rates of convergence between countries in line with the narratives 488 
which assume different degrees of reduction of inequality in various socio-economic characteristics: in SSP 489 
1, all countries converge in 2130 to the 75th percentile of the present-day distribution, for SSP2 in 2250, 490 
SSP3 assumes no convergence at all, for SSP4 in 2250, and SSP5 in 2180. 491 
 492 
Compositional analysis 493 
 494 
The composite nature of our dependent variable (voice and accountability, political stability, government 495 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, control of corruption) allows for the investigation of whether 496 
some of the dimensions stand out in their relationship with the covariates. We treated our governance 497 
variable with an isometric-log transformation4, and subsequently regressed it against our covariates. This 498 
process yields weights within each covariate that relate to each of the dimensions of the governance index, 499 
thereby disentangling the extent to which each of the covariates relates to the components of the 500 
governance indicator. 501 
 502 
In our analysis of the composite Worldwide Governance Index (comprising six dimension of governance), 503 
we find a distinct relationship between post-secondary education and two dimensions of the dependent 504 
variable: control of corruption and government effectiveness (see Figure 1 in Supplementary Material). This 505 
effect is not surprising and presents additional evidence concerning the importance of education (post-506 
secondary education) for better institutions and demand for eradication of corruption5. Based on this 507 
finding, we separately project indicators of corruption and government effectiveness, thereby capturing the 508 
effect of different rate of change of educational expansion across the scenarios (see Figures 2-5 in 509 
Supplementary Information). 510 
 511 
 512 
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